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Testing the Expectations Model of the Term Structure: Some Conjectures on the Effects of Institutional Changes
HE TRADITIONAL expectatirmns model of time ten'm structure of interest n-ates attempts to explain hox\' intenest i-ates din a similar' debt instrument are related across difièn'ent nnatui-ities. tt posits that, in a wom'ld without risk on' one in which assets an'e pen'fect sintistitutes, time one-peririd inten'est n'ate should ed 1 ual the exper:ted r'etun'n to holding an instn-urnent cif longer matur'ity for' rine pen'iodl. Bec:ause the niciclel is based on the most fundamental economic assumptions -r'ational behax'-ion' by individuals who act on all ax'aitahle infoi-matimi -it has held consider-able appeal in applied n'esear-ch. Empin'icat tests for' data across a range cif countn'ies and sample periods, hciweven', have tendledi to i-eject this simple statement of the expectations mcidel.' Mcin'eox'en', expanding the basic: model by adding other' explanatonw x'an'iahles, such as a time-varying nisk pi-emium or latent infonmation variables, still has found limited ennpin'ical success in explaining intenest n'ate behavior? Thus, a puzzle n'emains: why is such a basic theon'etir:al model so frequently n-ejer:ted by the data?
In this anticle, using short maturities in the Eurocurrencx' man'ket, we isolate several institutional factor's that might explain some nejectiomms of the expectations model. Alternatively, the analysis may lie viewed as an attempt to suggest specific characten-istics of policy procedun-es that are inconsistent with the thecin'etical nncidei's assunnptious. Our n'esults suggest that single-countrx' estimates of the expectations model niay omit important mnfon-mation because financial markets an'e highly integn'ated across countries. Moreover', it appears as if the manner' in which monetary policy is coniducted has effects on interest i-ares that contribute to rejections of the theory. In pan'ticulam', the expectations model does not hold in countries where the central bank -at least penodically -follows an exchange rate rifle. Acr:ounting for relationships aci-oss markets and for' the manncr in which nnonetany policy is conducted n-cverses, in some cases, the negative couchirsion of simple. single equation estimates of ten-m strt,ncture m-elationships -'For a survey of these results, see Bisignano (1987) .
'Examples of work along these lines are Shiller, et al. (1983) and Campbell and Clarida (1987) .
THE EXPECTATIONS MODEL APPLIED TO SHORT MATURITIES
The emnpin-ic:al version cif the expectations modlel c:ani lie written as:
Ill lr',, -I',) = a + hlF,, -n') + e, wher-e r, is the vic'ld ciii a cine-per-lod bill in period andl ,F',~, is the current, ohsei~'edforward rate cm a one-per'iod bill, one period kilo the future? Codficients to lie estimated ale denoted a and b; e, is an en-ncir ten-mu with zero mean and van-iamlce edlual to cr'. 'l'hus, in equation 1, the dependent variable is the dliffen'enice between actual vieldls on cineper-icid bills in consecutix'e periodls and time explanatory x'ar-iatilcn is the difler-euce betvx'een the cur'-rent fon'wardi and spot rates oni one-per'iodl hills. Equation I p1-edicts that the chanige mm cinmepen'icid yields should lie related to the for-ecasted change. as n'epr-eseuted by the fcirwan'd n'ate -spot n-ate spread. 'l'he expectalious hypothesis implies that, if the for-wan-cl n-ate is an unthiased predictor' of the futur'e spot n'ate, the n-egn'ession's slope cciefficient, h, should not he significantly different from oue and its intercept, a, should not he significantly ci iffer'enmt fn'om zen'o.
This pcmteutiallv r-ich area for ennpin-ical research has yielded fex•x' dlefiuitix'e r'esults because tests cif the expectations model inexitalily have been joint tests of sex'er-al maintaiuedl hypotheses. To cite just a fe~x'of the problems that arise, the model assumes a zen'o or' ccmnmstanmt n-isk premium. The pr-oblemn fon' estiuiationi, howeven', is that the risk trw, ten-mi pn'emiinm -sonic systematic cliffen'ence between the lcing-ter-ni interest n-ate amid the cxpectedl futur'e values of short-ten-ni inter-est n'ates that n'eflects n'elatix'e degrees dif uncen'taiutv -is uncibser-x'ahle. Thus, if an empirical test r'ejects time hypothesis a = 0 and h = 1, it is ncit liossilile to discriminate hetweemi tr'ue model rejection and the pcissilile effects of a tenu premium that has lieen assumed, incorr'ec:tly, to lie zero. In pan't fdir this r-eason, as will be the case below, many studies have chosen to test a weaker form of the expectations model (Ii = ii arid interpret the statistical significanc:e cif the regr-ession's initet-cept as indicatirig time existence of a ten-ni lmr-eniuum.' 'l'lmer'e an'e dither testing pn'ohlems as well. When dlata for' longel' maturities are studied, interest n'ate diata often are estimated fronu a fitted yield cinrve rather than taken fn'om obsen'vedl market transactidinms. In this instance, nmegative results might be a rejection dif the formula used to approximate unotiservalile interest rates rather' than the expectatidmns modhel. F'imially, the rationahty of expectations by mar'kcrt agents is assunmed but, agaimi, this is difficult~ir'impossible to test dhr-ectlv. Although mon'e attention has been paid in recent research to mnodels that isolate these assumptions, it n'emaius impossible to say whether negative results indicate a r-ejection of the expectations model itself or simply one Icir mcmr-el of its under-lying assumptions.
ESTINLATION OF THE EXPECTATIONS MODE.L
As udited in the iutn'oduction, ecluations similar to ill have been estimated with data for many countries and sauiple periods. We illustrate these results by estimating equaticmn I witim Har'n'is Bank data cm spcmt thr'ee-ruonth deposit rates fr-dmni the Eurocur'rency niiarket for' the US., UK., West Gen'-many, Jalian arid Sxvitzer-l~uid;six-nidmuth deposit rates also were used, as explained in footnote 3, to calculate values for tIme fcin'wan'd rate. The interest rates are calculated as simple rates. The data are Friday closing quoles for the Friday closest to time Imeginniug of each mouth? 'i'he sample period spans February 1981 thn'ough October' 1986. Althciugh data prior' to 1981 are ax'aiiatmle, the Euroyen nimanket was thinly tr-aded and, in 1980, the Carter Adiministratiomi adopted its Special Credit Conitn-ol pr-cmgn-am. Because these factor-s 'For one derivation of this result, see Mankiw and Miron (1986) , p.214. Strictly speaking, this specification holds up to a constant (the term premium), which we have ignored. The assumption was that, for the short maturities used in this paper, term premium effects, if any, should be negligible. Also see Bisignano (1987) . Cosset (1982) found that forward rates in this market are unbiased, but not optimal, predictors of future interest rates. He also found this market to be efficient in the sense that past information on interest rates is not useful in predicting future values of interest rates.
Values for the forward rate, ,F,,,,, were calculated as twice the two-period interest rate minus the one-period rate. Because the data in the study use three-month rates to represent the theoretical "one period," the forward rate is calculated as twice the six-month (two period) rate minus the corresponding threemonth rate. 'See, for example, Shiller, et al, (1983) . 'First-Friday-of-month data, rather than monthly averages of daily or weekly data, were used to avoid questions about how to treat partial weeks in adjoining months, months with different numbers of weeks and the gap between three, four-week months and a thirteen week quarter. See Hakkio and Leiderman (1984) for a discussion of these measurement issues. 
Finally, a comment cm flu nil al '11)1 1mm iach to estimation is necessirx 1k-i .ruse lu lata consist of observations (in thmm-r immomiih x rIds~ampled monthly, the changes in immu-m-i-st mmli-smm\ erlap and intn'oduce a second order moving amm age pnocess into the data, Because this prcmper'ty of the data will affect the estimated coefficients standard em'ror's, it must lie consider-ed by time estimation technique. The Hanseu-Hodn-ick pr'ocedur-e we use accounts for-this pn'opert~by ccmrrecting the ruodel's ern'or term for serial cor'n'elation?
BASIC RESULTS
The n'esults fl-on) estiniatinig equation 1 an-c n-cpom'tedl in table 1, 'l'he expectations mcidel is clean-ly r'ejectedl for the Uuited States, Germany and Switzerland; their estimated slope coefficients an'e significantly difl'en'ent fi'cmm mine. In conitr'ast, the results for' time United Kingdom and Japan support the expectations model, Explanatony power' fon' the edluations is generally low with time notable exception of Japan)? This n-esult is typical in estimates of the expectations mcidel, indicating that inten'est rate time sen-ies closely approximate a random walk. Overall, these mixed n'esulls represent the typical findinigs of pn-ex'immus ernpii'ical wmmr-k on the expectations nuodel.
The ruixed n-esults in) table 1 can lime in terpre ted in two ways. Due initerpr'etatiou is that time expectations model is rejected Imecause it appears not to hold fcmr mcmst of the countries exanunedl, Another interpretation is that instituticmual or other considerations, which the pure theory n-egar-ds either as given or uuimnpon-tant, may have had adverse effects on the empirical tests. Anmong of lien's, impon--taut stn-uctun-al changes that will affect the n-esults include time condfuct of U.S. mmmnetan-x' policy, changes in iuter-est n-ate ceilings anid general financial market deregulation. Given the results shown in table 1, pr'evioins n'esean-ch genen-allv has left these results unexplained or has addled some ad hoc measun'e of risk to account fon' time pmmssihle effects of an unobservable ten-ri) pn-emiunm. In time sections that fcmllow, we first revise time estimation pr'cmceclur'e to see how this change affects the test n'esults, We therm discuss some well-defined ex'ents and changes in instituticmus that ccmuldl affect time term structun-e relations and pn'oduce time results that appear-to m'eject the model.
ONE POSSIBLE REASON FOR REJECTION OF THE EXPECTATIONS MODEL: CORRELATED E.RROR TERMS
The irmcn-easiug integration of wdmr'id capital mat'-kets suggests that an alternative statistical appn'oach shciulml lie used to estimate equation I . As capital flows freely among nations, nndmuetarv policy actions (for-example) under-taken in one cciunmtry can lie expected to affect financial varialiles in other counmtn-ies as well, Consider', for-example, a change in Bundeslmank policy that affects Ger'man inter-est m'ates andi then is tr-ausmitted to iuten-est rates in time other fcmum' nations via calmital flows causedl by the change in German inten-est rates, This effect, which will appean' only in the en'n'or ten-ni of time Germuan interest n-ate equation xvhenm sepan'ate regressions an-c estimated, could be cximloited as a new sour-ce of information for each r'egn'ession if time country equations wel'e estimated 'In fact, the U.S. results are extraordinarily sensitive to these few data points. The dramatic increase in interest rate volatility during the first and second quarters of 1980, relative to the remaining sample, would suggest this sensitivity in OLS regression estimates. 'For an extensive description of the econometrics used to account for the effects of the third-order serial correlation, see Hansen and Hodrick (1980) and Campbell and Clarida (1987) .
'Durbin-Walson statistics are not reported because, as indicated in the text, the reported standard errors reflect corrections for serial correlation in the data. NOTE AbsolLine va-,jr,s et t'ctatisi cs ,jr5 in 0a-em,tnpse, Fo-h the i-statistic anp-en, 'o tne r~hynntnc.s:s A-i aste'sk rncicatps i slope n oeff,r cit sign t-cantiy caterer tom one at the 0,05 level c' s:gn-ficance
jointly, In other' words, time error' term of a single equation which n'eflects "news." on' unpn'edictable events within that countn-yl also nua conmtair inmfon'-mation -due to linkages aruonmg uman-kets -that is relevant to explainming inter'est n'ate imeimavior in another country. 'lime inmportanmt pcmint is that the expectations modeh lmeinmg tested assumes that this infor-matiou is heing used by the national agents whose collective acticmus deten-minme changes in inten'est rates-Single equation estinmates, however', exclude time infonnationm implicit in these linkages because they look at data for each country mi isolatimmnOne way to account for this ruissinmg infon'rtmation is to estimate equation 1, as applied to the five countr'ies under study, as a system of seemingly unrelated regressions SUB).' This procedure consider's contemporaneous conn'eiations that might exist among time en-mr tenms rmf the five equations and, by doing so, impr'oves the efficiency with which the coefficients an'e estimated.
The SlUR Results
The results fr-or)) estimating the five equationms by SUR are repon'ted in table 2, 'that inupoi'tarmt information exists in the enrol' tenors is snmhstantiated by time comu 1 muted value of 56.34 for-a I ikel Imood ratio statistic testing whether rovan-ianices among the em't'ol tei'mins are zem-o; this value is to he compared with the 5 percent ci-itirai value of 18.30. 'the er'oi' coval'ianre amid correlation matr-ices t-epcmi-ted it) talmie 3 indicate where the sigmuticant coi'm-clations between count ties were fuund. Note, in pan-ticulam', the high com-t'elations hetwee I) the If .S. an ci Get-many a ndl between Get-many and Swit/erlandi. Con~ectumusto explain these cone lations am)d, )ossitmiv, nuodel rejections ate dinsctissed later it) m-efet'enee to the tatile 4 n'esults.
Al thougim OLS and Stfi't shotrlcl pn'ocluce similar coefficient estinmiates, both the U.S. and S~•viss slope coefficients repon-ted in table 2 arm: mam'kedlv differ-cut fr'mmnmm their values in table I -In view of time low values for if in liotli the t .S. and Swiss equations, hcmwevei-, these cimauges u ier'elv indicate that, for-these data, the basic specification of the expectations model simply dcmes not produce jirecisc estinmates of the slope coefficient. 'l'he rmiore inuportant tmcminmt is timat, after using time SUB estinmmaton-, time hypolimesis that all five slope coefficients are jointly equal to one still is rejected. Finally, the Japanese initet-cept, which did not change uunmmen'ically, rmow is significarmth' different fr-oru zc:r'o. Because time Gen'umarm and tJ ,K. n'esuits are iam'gely nit)-affectedl by time SUB estinuationm, however, this simple change mm estinuatior) pn'ocedlur'e to incon--1 mor'ate linkages among financial umar-kets, while indicating timat sigrmificanmt inmfon'matiorm exists in time correlations anuotmg enrol' terms across equatnorms, still n-ejects the expectaticinms modfel for most of the counmtr'ic-~sexamniuedf.
(fl'IIER SOURCES OF EXPLOITABLE INFORMAIJON
Ancither assunmptimmn behind enmpin'ical tests cif the expectations nmmodel is tlmat time data used for' estinnationm wet-c genmer-ated dlurinmg a pen'iod character-ized lmy a statmie econmcmmic stn-ucture. Mon-coven', the data should he drawn fr'onm nmankets in which inter'est rates can adjust freely. 't'lmus, the basic model should not be estinmiated witim data from pen'iods associated with umajor policy 'Edwards (1982) has made the same point and reported muchimproved results for a similar model applied to the exchange rate. Krol (1987) also reported substantial integration of these markets across countries. , however, finds little correlation across countries and speculates that capital controls may "prevent effective international arbitrage (p. 66)". See Zellnem (1962) for details on the estimation procedure. 
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Chart 1 Changes in Federal Funds Rate
tuate within wider-bands than had the previous pn'ocedun'e, which had focused on keeping the federal funds n'ate withinm a narrow nange. In October 1982, the Feden'al Reserve announced that, due to increasing uncertainties about the definition of the Ml aggregate, it would conduct monetan'v policy by setting an) objective for' hot-rowed neserves; this latter strategy n'esulted in less van-iation in shon't-term inmterest m'ates.'°Thus, the first part of the sanmple per-iod used mm the estimation is chat'-acten'ized by a Fed oper'atinmg procedure that penumitted gu'eateu' variatiorm inn shon-t-term interest n'ates; timis pei'iod is followed by foun' years cmf data associated with a pr'ocedure that, cmnmce againm, reduced the variatimmnn in shor't-tet'nmm inmtem'est n'ates, The belmavior of the feden-al funds nate, which suppon'ts tlmis depiction of events, is simownm in chart 1.
1-low would this switch in policy irnplenuentation affect tests cmf the expectations model? Acccmrding to Mankiw and Mirou (1986) , Fed policy based on smocmtiming short-term intem'est rates can he ciman'acterized as:
(2) E, (Ar,_ ,) = 0 or'. time expectedi change in the shon't-rate at each nuonuent in time is zero even if the Fed has been otmsetved to change shon't n'ates mm response to. say, real GNP growth cmr inflation n'ates that deviated from pm'ior expectations, If equation 2 desctibes Fed policy since October' 1982 (audI pricmr to October 1979 , the value of (,F,,,, -r,,) in equation 1 will always he zero anmd shon't-term inten'est rates will behave, appn'oximately, as a n'audomn walk. In this case, the expectations modei of the ten-rn stt-uctun-e would be incapable of exphaining the behavior of shot-t-ter'm interest rates.
Maukiw and Mit-on (1986) inmvestigated this problem usinmg annual U.S. data froru 1890 -1914 and 'See Watich (1984 and Gilbert (1985) for more discussion about changes in the implementation of U.S. monetary policy over time. 79  80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  1988  4 1915-TO. They founmd that support for the expectations nmodel van'ied vvitim nuonmet-arv regime. Wimile time expectationms model 'holds' for the pn-e-Fed pen'iod, when then'e was nmo nmonetany anntimoritv to snuooth inten'est r'ates, the model is rejected fon' time later period wimenu time Fed's approach to pcilicv tended to smootim flucLuaticinus in shon't-ten-nm inter--est i'ates. Their results, timer'efot'e, suggest that the tJ.S, resinlts n-epon'ted mm table 2 -anmd pen'haps other reject'nonms of time model usinmg post-1979 U.S. data -could) be dominated by time sub-sample associatedl with the post-October 1982 chanmge in F'eden'al Reserve operating procedlures.
Percent
.Eilects oJ'Exchange Rate .trnterventiorm Rules 't'ime fotnnding of tIme Eun-opean Mcmetat'v System (EMS) is anmotlmen irnpon'tanmt chanmge timat occurred in 1979 anmd is a possible soui'ce of the nmegative results for Gen-nmmany andl Switzen-Iand. Tlme EMS agteenmeut establislmed ranges fon' bilateral exchange m'ates of the nnenmben' countn'ies and called for' coopet-ative intenvenmtionms by the central banks of the countries involved wimen) n-ates deviatedi fn'onm their specified rammges. Thus, Ger'nuanm nuonnenam'v policy sirmce 1979 has been conmstrained by its participatior) in the exchanmge nate agn'eennenmt audi its pledge to inten'vene.'' hi practice, Germans' has become the leader of the EMS due to the size of its econonmv and its low inmflationm n-ate; dither EMS countn'ies have followed its nonminmfiatiormarv nnonetarv policy. Muclm r'esean-ch Imas simown timat time EMS agreenuent really has hehavedi as if a dollanY [3M objective were pun'sued by tine Gen'nuan centn'ai bank. trm addition, Swiss nnonetany policy is influenmced by time nM/Swiss franmc exchange i-ate even though Switzerlanmd is not anm EMS nmmember." Because standlard models typically explain time beimavior of time exchange r'ate as depending cirm time spn-ead between foreigrm anmd domestic iutei'est n'ates, attempts by the Buniclesbank to infiuenmce time dollar-I DM excimange m'ate also would create a strong link imet'ween) Gen'nmman and Swiss inten'est n-ates.' 4 Suppose, for example, that time dollar were depn'eciating againush the DM because U.S. interest rates were fallinmg. The Bunmdesbank could atterupn to stop or reverse timis dollar dlepn'eciation by expanmding time German nmonmey stock and loweu'ing Gem-man simon'tten-mu interest n'aLes. Suc:h an action, imoweven', wouldi cause time value of time Swiss fu-anc to rise against tIme DM. tr) time past, the Swiss National Bank has responded to this or similar) sequenmce of evenuts b folloivirmg time Bunmdeshank with a muone expansionary monetary policy and lower simort-ten'nmm irmten'est rates as it attempted to n'eestablish some desired value for time DM/Swiss fr-anc exchange rate, This close linmkage of Gei-nuani and Swiss intetest rates, fronm a Swiss objective for stability of time bilater'al excimange n'ate, is likely to he time soun-ce of tlme highly con'n'eiated Swiss anmd Gei-ruan en'n'on' ter'nms n'epon'ted mm table 3~~5 mm sunm, hotim Ger'muanm and Swiss monmetany policies are influenced by exchange n-ate cormsiden'ations timat could affect enupirical estinnates of time expectations nnodel.
Empirical Implementation
'l'o itmt'estigate timese possibilities, time system of SUB equations n'epon-ted mm table 2 was n-eestimated with changes in tIme US., Ger'nuan and Si~4ssr'egn'essions. For time 11.5,, time whole-sample slope coeff'ncienmt was split to represenmt the two distinmct periodis of F'eden'al Reserve operatinmg procedlun-es. A slope durunmy (MTARGETI was introduced, wimich took a value of one between Februan-v 1981 and Septenmber 1982 and a value of zercu for the remainminmg montims. If the Mankiw-Min-on hypotimesis is com'n'ect, the slope coefficient fon' time fin'st pan't of the sanmple lb plus MTAHGETI slmould not be significantly differ'ent fn'onu one while the coethcienmt fon' time latten' period lb alone) should he significantly diffen-ent (less Lhanm) fn'onm onme.'" Although the precise way to quantihi time inmpact of time EMS agr'eenmment on Ger'marm and Swiss fimmarmcial nmarkets is not clean', time pen'iods when tIme 'The history of the EMS and a discussion of how it functions can be found in Ungerer, en al, (1986) . 2See for example, Fels (1987) for a discussion of the EMS as a dollar/OM commitment by the Bundesbank. 'Because trade represents 39 percent of Swiss GOP and trade with Germany accounts for one-fifth of tonal trade, the Swiss franc/GM exchange rate has been particularly important to the conduct of Swiss monetary policy. The Swiss National Bank, at times, has abandoned its obiectives for the growth rate of the monetary base and, instead, pursued an exchange rate obiective. See Rich and Beguelin (1985) . 14 5ee, for example, the model presented by Dornbusch (1980) .
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A related point that suggests this sort of influence across countries is based on results from Belongia and Ott (1988) . They show that the dollar exchange rate risk premium and the amount that the exchange rate adjusts to a given domesticforeign interest differential both vary with the choice of Federal Reserve operating procedure (interest rate vs. money stock objectives). If nothing else, their result would be suggestive of a time varying risk premium in the expectations model.
"An intercept dummy also was tried but it was not significant individually and had no material effects on the magnitudes or significance of other coefficients.
member countries agreed to nmajdun nuahgmmnmemmts of the official exchange n-ate levels and m'anmges are known, Othen' things the same, one can hvpothesize that inten'est rates made dlisctete adjustnmmenmts to these reahgnnnments within one nnonmth after the~' were announced, To test the pm'oposition about exchange n'ate linkages and immterest m'ates, a dumnmy variable was created to n'epm'esent EMS realignments anmd was intm'odum:ed into hotim the German and Swiss n'egn'essions. This variable tcuok a value of one during the months associated witim the eight EMS n'eahgnruermts and a value of zen-o during all othem-months," As witim time US. case, multiplying the forward n-ate -spot n-ate spr'ead in the German and Swiss n'egr'essions by timis dumnmy variable permits the estimation of two diffen'ent values for the n'egressions' slope coefficients: one coefficient for 'nornmal" periods arid the sum of two coefficients for months when a m'ealignment occurred, in table 4, the revised SUB results are reported. The null hypothesis that all five slope coefficients ane jointly equal to one is rejected, once again, at the 0.05 level of significance, 'rhe expectations model is rejected even after augnmenting the infon'-mation set to incorporate changes in the implementation of US, monetany policy and the EMS realignments.
Looking at individual country results, the table's top row, associated with the slope dummy for the period of monetary targeting in the United States, indicates that estimates of the expectations model am'e sensitive to changes in the Fed's openating procedure. Even though the MTARGET dumnuy is not significant, the model's whole-pen'iod slope coefficient inmcn-eases fn'om 0.20 to 0.45 and nciw is not significantly different fn'om one. i'his apparent impm'ovement in time US, mesults. however, is in direct contrast to Mankiw anmd Min'on's results in two n'espects, First. wimen they attempted to investigate the effects of post-1979 data on the expectations model, they teponted that "we obtain standard em'rors so lam-ge that one can reject no interesting l~pothesis' (p. 227).
Mon'e impon'tant, they hypothesized that the expectations model should riot he rejected fon' the period of immoney stock tam'geting, hut should he rejected for the post-September 1982 period; empirically, this implies that h plus MTARGET should nmot be statistically nlifiei-unm t fiurmm 0 nme n'imi Ic b alorme should be significantly differ'emit fm-minim (less tlmanl onme. in fact, time n'esul ts au'e u'eveu'sed; the ex pectationms model is n-ejected for time pet-nod of ummonmey stock tar-getinmg. 'l'lmus, while the clumnnmy variable improves time overall m'esults and pr'ovides pem'lmaps a stm'onger test of their' model, time exact process at work is incommsistenmt witim time one lmvpothesized, leaving an urmexplainedi puzzle.
Time revised estimates for-time Gernmman anmd Swiss equations pn'ovide weak suppom't fon time conjectum'e timat the intervenmtiorm policies cif their-centn'al banks imaye significanmt effects onm tests cuf the expectatiotms nmmodel, Time signs on time slope dunmnmmies an-c negative anmd similar inn nmagnitude, to the i,vimoie pem'iod slope coefticient, wimicim indicates timat the fcirwar'd rate-spot n'ate spread has zen-n effect diun-itmg nmonths of EMS m'eahgnnuents. Moreover', time whole per-tonI Swiss slope coefficient now botim is lam'ger numem'icall and not sigtmificantly diffen'ent fronm onme, Fot-Germany. however', tine results are not altem-ed when the dates of EMS m-ealignmenmts am-c considered anmcl time data continue to n-eject the expectations model.
CONCLUSIONS
The expectations model of time ternn str-ucture of interest rates has been applied to data for a mmumher of countries and sample per'iods with genen'-ally negative results, tim timis article we have investigated sonne cormditiorms under whicim time expectationms nmodei might lie n'ejected mm time conmtext of its traditiormai single equation test. We found substantial connelations across the em'm'om's of the individual equations which, wImerm exploited by using SUB estinnation, impr'oved time efficiency of estimation. We also found that, altimougim dunmnmy variables used to represent changes in the appn-oacim to monetary policy or EMS exchange rate targets wet-c not significanmt individually, they cormtn'ibuted somuewhat to improved oven-all ciman-actet'-istics of time edluations. Although, as in previous studies, many puzzles still n'enmain, these results suggest timat tests of the expectationms ruodel should use nuote genem'al models and mon-c efficient estimatiorm pn'ocedun'es than the sinuple OLS equation typically employed.
"The dates of EMS realignments were March 23 and October 5, 1981; February 22 and June 14, 1982; March21, 1983; July 22, 1985; April 7 and August 4, 1986 and are provided in Fels, p.217.
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